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This paper investigates the changing duties and responsibilities of 
boards and directors of Australian public companies. The corporate 
governance environment in Australia is currently going through a period 
of significant transformation raising the question of whether in this 
fluid and shifting environment company and board performance can 
still be assessed largely on the basis of profit, share price and dividends 
generated over the short term. These almost certainly will continue for 
some time to be the key metrics of company and board performance 
and it is hard to see how it could be otherwise. Nevertheless, a growing 
chorus of influential stakeholders is calling for the introduction of a 
more balanced and comprehensive suite of performance indicators that 
better reflect the realities of corporate governance early in the Twenty-
first Century. The paper examines how these stakeholders are reshaping 
corporate governance in Australia and also calling for a reconsideration 
of the way in which performance is assessed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper considers the extent to which an 
Australian publicly-listed (public) company’s 
performance can be attributed to the governance 
performance of its board. A primary question also 
addressed therefore is how company performance 
itself should be evaluated. Of particular interest will 
be whether, as Australia’s system of corporate 
governance goes through a process of significant 
reformulation and change, the conventional metrics 
of profit, share price and dividends can any longer 
together be taken as the sole or most important and 
accurate gauge of a company’s performance and by 
extension a board’s performance as well. It is 
obvious then that the paper addresses largely 
through an Australian lens the question of what 
indicators other than these conventional metrics can 
be used to ensure a more balanced and 
comprehensive picture of company and board 
performance is produced than has traditionally been 
possible. Even with its distinctly Australian focus, 
however, there are good grounds for believing that 
the relevance of any answers offered in the paper 
extends well beyond the Australian context to other 
countries and national economies. Just as in 
Australia so in other jurisdictions around the world, 
the question of what criteria should be used to 
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measure company and board performance is 
becoming an increasingly urgent one as company 
boards and executives confront a number of 
significant environmental, political and social 
challenges.  
The following section critically reviews recent 
academic literature addressing the change and 
transformation through which corporate governance 
is going. The corporate governance literature is 
sometimes an agent of change, more often it tries to 
make sense of changes that are in process or that 
have already occurred. This change, and less 
frequently a deeper structural or systemic 
transformation, is an inevitable product of the ways 
in which company boards, executive managers, 
corporate regulators, shareholders and other key 
stakeholders have attempted to manage or mitigate 
the environmental, political, and social challenges 
and risks confronting the companies in which they 
have a stake. Change can also occur as these actors 
look to the future and seek ways of turning risks 
and challenges into opportunities or, when this is 
not possible, of nullifying them in some way. Often, 
change comes about as a result of influential actors 
trying to find ways of not allowing history to repeat 
itself thereby avoiding another disaster like the 
Global Financial Crisis. The Trump Presidency has 
thrown up challenges and risks on each of these 
levels and these have been registered in various 
ways at home in the United States and abroad in the 
countries it trades with (China is the obvious case in 
point). In the midst of all this change and 
transformation, corporate governance as a set of 
principles, a field of practice and an academic 
discipline has learned or been forced to evolve and 
adapt. The literature review is chiefly concerned 
with how this process of evolution and adaptation 
has unfolded.  
After reviewing the literature, the paper moves 
on to provide a brief, introductory overview of the 
existing system of corporate governance in 
Australia. It then investigates and evaluates in 
considerably more depth the new (4th) edition of the 
Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (hereafter Principles and 
Recommendations or simply Principles). The 
Corporate Governance Council of the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) first released the new 
edition in Draft form for stakeholder consultation 
and set 27 July 2018 as the closing date for 
submissions (the role of the Corporate Governance 
Council is explained in the section of Australia’s 
existing corporate governance system). The Council 
then circulated a Consultation Paper in May 2018 
and released the final version of the Principles in 
February 2019. This is due to come into force for 
financial years commencing on or after 1 January 
2020. The paper’s examination of the Principles and 
Recommendations (Draft and final versions) focuses 
on those sections that can potentially make an 
important contribution to current Australian and 
global debates about the criteria by which company, 
and board, performance should be measured. Of 
particular interest is the inclusion in the Draft of the 
new edition of the principles of the social licence to 
operate, acting in a socially responsible manner, and 
policies on whistleblowing and anti-corruption and 
bribery. The absence in the final version of any 
explicit reference to the social licence to operate will 
receive particular attention.  
Having reviewed the Consultation Draft and 
final version of the new edition of Principles and 
Recommendations, the chapter goes on to consider 
some of the more interesting and provocative 
responses to the governance implications of both 
versions of the document. It considers, in particular, 
the reaction to the two versions of the AICD, 
Australia’s pre-eminent organisation representing 
company directors, the views of ASIC1, Australia’s 
chief corporate regulator (introduced in the 
following section), and the evaluations of ACSI, a 
large and influential organisation representing and 
advocating for Australian institutional investors and 
asset owners2. These several perspectives and 
viewpoints together are helping to define the 
contours of the ongoing Australian and global 
debate about board governance and company 
performance, what performance means and how it 
should be measured, and about corporate 
governance and its role and purpose more generally.  
 
2. THE CHANGING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
ENVIRONMENT: A REVIEW OF THE RECENT 
LITERATURE 
There can be little doubt that corporate governance, 
both as a field of practice and an academic 
discipline, is undergoing significant change. This 
change is in response to a number of external 
environmental, political and social challenges that 
are forcing company boards and executive managers 
to rethink corporate strategies, objectives, ways of 
doing business and methods of engaging with the 
shareholders and other stakeholders of the 
companies they oversee. In short, and as this 
literature review seeks to reveal and explain, 
addressing these challenges is transforming the 
meaning, purpose and conduct of corporate 
governance. It is as well transforming the way in 
which board performance and company 
performance are evaluated. The corporation’s 
purpose has in the process been going through a 
process of dramatic review and redirection as well. 
In the United States the Trump Presidency, in 
particular Donald Trump himself, has compelled 
boards to rethink their approach to climate change 
and a range of significant social issues like same sex 
marriage and LGBTIQ rights. At the same time, it has 
forced boards, executive managers, investors and 
shareholders as well as other stakeholders, to start 
thinking about what the purpose of the corporation, 
especially their own but more generally as well, 
should be in this changing corporate governance 
environment. This in turn is having significant 
implications for companies’ corporate social 
responsibility and risk management policies, 
stakeholder engagement strategies, and for the 
ethical business practices they adopt and how these 
are enacted (for an interesting exploration of CSR as 
a self-defence strategy against managerial discretion 
costs, see Villarón-Peramato, Martínez-Ferrero, 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that ASIC made no formal or public response to the 
release of the final version of the 4th edition even though it had commented 
on the Draft.  
2 In full, AICD is the Australian Institute of Company Directors and ACSI is 
the Australian Council of Superannuation Investors.  
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García-Sánchez, 2016). Marcia Weldon, for example, 
argues that ‘boards of socially responsible 
companies should not reverse course under the 
Trump Administration’ but should instead ‘serve 
stakeholder interests by staying the course even 
when legislative changes related to the environment, 
social issues, and corporate governance may allow 
firms to relax standards or eliminate programs’ 
(Weldon, 2017; see also Bruner, 2018). This requires 
‘at a minimum’ meaningful engagement with 
shareholders including full disclosure to them of the 
likely impacts of changes to environmental and 
social policies. At a more fundamental level, boards 
and senior managers have to ask themselves what 
they are willing to accept or tolerate as they pursue 
shareholder value, what they mean by shareholder 
value, and the extent to which both of these align 
with what shareholders actually want and expect 
(Weldon, 2017). In a provocative piece about ‘letting 
Trump be Trump’, Kelly Carter asks whether 
shareholders prefer political connectedness or 
corporate social responsibility and social justice. In 
Carter’s view this is a very significant question 
because the choice is a mutually-exclusive or binary 
one (Carter, 2018). In other words, a company can in 
response to ‘shocking’ presidential events (she uses 
the example of Trump’s reactions to the 2017 white 
supremacist rally in Charlottesville Virginia when 
one counter-protester was run over and killed by a 
neo-Nazi) either retain its existing political 
connections or choose CSR and social justice and 
sever these connections (Carter, 2018). Carter’s data 
set comprises publicly-traded companies that left 
Trump’s Manufacturing Jobs Initiative and Strategic 
and Policy Forum following his remark that there 
were ‘some very fine people on both sides’. For 
Carter the ‘main finding’ of the study reported in her 
paper is that shareholders prefer political 
connectedness over CSR and the pursuit of social 
justice.  
Caroline Kaeb’s ‘essay’ ‘makes a first attempt to 
lay out the main parameters of a normative 
framework for corporate engagement with public 
policy as part of a broader corporate responsibility 
paradigm’ and seeks ‘to provide some guideposts for 
companies to identify and engage on public policy 
issues affecting their stakeholders and shaping their 
business environment’ (Kaeb, 2018). Kaeb points out 
that corporate leaders, and sometimes their 
shareholders as well, are increasingly happy to be 
seen as ‘agents of social change’ and ‘advocates on 
human rights’ in the face of, for example, the ‘U.S. 
President’s controversial immigration policies’. She 
acknowledges that the motivations for taking on 
these roles can be ‘complex’ ones ‘including strong 
reputational considerations with very tangible 
business implications’ (Kaeb, 2018; Nielson & 
Thomsen, 2018 explore the role played by the 
pursuit of legitimacy in firms’ selection of CSR 
communication strategies and practices). It 
nevertheless is the case that the way corporate 
leadership engages with public policy has evolved 
and adapted to the changing business and political 
environment. These developments have ‘important 
normative implications’ calling for ‘operational 
guidance for companies’ on how best to put this 
‘self-proclaimed mandate’ into practice. 
Unfortunately, Kaeb is unable to offer such 
operational guidance. However, she does suggest 
that the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, giving effect to the Protect, Respect 
and Remedy framework, might be a good starting 
point. While the Guiding Principles do not set out 
‘nuanced decision points for companies on how to 
engage proactively with public policy in order to 
advance societal values and human rights’ they do 
establish ‘a normative framework on the corporate 
responsibility to protect human rights’ and an 
‘indispensable baseline’ for the human rights 
responsibilities of business (Kaeb, 2018).  
Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert McCorquodale 
point out that due diligence is ‘at the heart’ of the 
Guiding Principles. However, they argue that there 
are two different concepts of ‘due diligence’ at work 
in the Guiding Principles. They further claim that 
this is not acknowledged in the Guiding Principles 
nor therefore is there any attempt to ‘explain how 
the two concepts relate to one another in the context 
of business and human rights’ (Bonnitcha & 
McCorquodale, 2017; see also Wettstein & Backer, 
2015). While human rights lawyers, according to 
Bonnitcha and McCorquodale, regard due diligence 
‘as a standard of conduct required to discharge an 
obligation’, business people typically understand 
due diligence to be a process that is required to 
manage business risks (Bonnitcha & McCorquodale, 
2017). In their view, ‘a business enterprise’s 
responsibility to respect human rights is best 
understood as comprising two elements: its 
responsibility for its own adverse human rights 
impacts and its responsibility for the human rights 
impacts of third parties with which it has business 
relationships’ (Bonnitcha & McCorquodale, 2017). 
They believe that this interpretation resolves the 
fundamental confusion or inconsistency in the 
Guiding Principles and also has practical relevance 
in that it clarifies the standard of conduct that 
businesses are expected to meet to avoid any 
adverse human rights impacts. In her article on the 
Guiding Principles and corporate moral agency, 
Patricia Werhane considers the difficult question of 
whether corporations should themselves be 
regarded as having moral rights. Taking the view 
that ‘human rights entail reciprocal responsibilities’ 
Werhane argues ‘if, as the Guiding Principles specify, 
for-profit corporations have responsibilities to 
protect human rights, then those whose rights are to 
be protected by corporations have reciprocal 
obligations to respect corporate rights’ (Werhane, 
2015). She also argues that corporations are not 
‘moral persons’ or ‘individual moral agents’. 
However, because corporations are ‘collective 
bodies’ that are owned, controlled and operated by 
individual moral agents, it is possible to ‘ascribe to 
corporations secondary moral agency as 
organizations’ (Werhane, 2015). This means that 
corporations and other organisations do have 
limited rights but these do not exceed the rights of 
individual persons and are restricted to economic 
not political engagements and activities (to the 
extent that these can be distinguished from each 
other) (Werhane, 2015). 
Brian Cheffins discusses the Trump 
Administration’s self-proclaimed deregulatory 
initiatives – in January 2017, for example, Trump 
referred to the Dodd-Frank Act as a ‘disaster’ and 
threatened to dismantle it – and wonders whether 
‘government action’ as a constraint on company 
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executives will recede, at least in the short to 
medium term, should any of these initiatives ever 
come to fruition (Cheffins, 2019). It appears that 
Trump was quite serious when he complained about 
Dodd-Frank because in May 2018 he signed into law 
the Senate Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and 
Consumer Protection Act. There is evidently some 
debate about whether this new Act effectively 
repealed and replaced Dodd-Frank that had become 
law in July 2010 and was intended to restore 
consumer confidence in the US financial industry 
following the ‘recession’ brought on by the GFC. 
Evidently, many Democrats and Republicans believe 
that the new act ‘doesn’t weaken regulations for the 
largest banks but do agree that it provides 
‘regulatory relief to smaller banks and financial 
institution (sic) throughout the United States’ 
(Dancer, 2019; see also Crabb, 2019). The repeal or 
weakening of the Dodd-Frank Act has implications 
well beyond the financial services industry and the 
United States. For example, Nicola Dalla Via and 
Paolo Perego investigate the Conflict Minerals 
Disclosure (CMD) that is mandatory under Section 
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (Dalla Via & Perego, 
2018). Conflict Minerals comprise coltan (tantalum is 
extracted from this metallic ore), cassiterite (one of 
the most important sources of tin), wolframite (the 
main source of tungsten) and gold which requires no 
further explanation. These are also known as the 
T3G minerals. Dalla Via and Perego’s study makes a 
contribution to the environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) literature which deals with these 
issues as being central to business strategy and 
treats ESG reporting as one of the publicly-available 
outcomes of managerial decision making. In other 
words, ESG reporting is central to social or public 
disclosure, stakeholder engagement, reputation 
management, and the social licence to operate. The 
Dodd-Frank Act’s CMD regime therefore played a 
crucial, but not completely effective, role in 
advancing these strategic purposes. As Dalla Via and 
Perego point out, Trump’s proposed ‘radical 
changes’ to the Dodd-Frank Act, including ‘relaxed’ 
enforcement of its CMD regime, ‘would conflict with 
concurrent initiatives by the European Union, China, 
Australia and Canada’ (Dalla Via & Perego, 2018). 
They also note that conflict minerals are a ‘highly 
controversial and sensitive topic’ that deserves 
further study in the US and other jurisdictions. It is 
not, of course, just conflict minerals that are 
controversial and sensitive. Shane Gunster and 
Robert Neubauer (2019), for example, investigate 
‘extractivist development’ in Canada and a proposed 
diluted bitumen pipeline. Gunster and Neubauer 
look in particular at the way in which the concept of 
social licence to operate has been converted in 
Canada from a public relations term intended to 
facilitate mining and extraction to a figure of speech 
that can be used by opponents to constrain this sort 
of development. Australia and other similar 
countries have witnessed a similar conversion.  
David Berger makes the fairly obvious point 
that there is now ‘a growing recognition that the 
model of stock(share)holder primacy is no longer 
acceptable, and that corporations must focus on 
broader purposes, beyond stockholder value’ 
(Berger, 2019). The renunciation or downgrading of 
shareholder primacy as the corporation’s overriding 
purpose means that it is now far less tenable for a 
board to downsize its company’s workforce, reduce 
the wages of its employees, minimise or evade taxes, 
disregard workplace health and safety obligations, 
or circumvent environmental regulations simply on 
the pretext that these will increase the company’s 
profits and share price. This all raises the significant 
question of what the purpose of the corporation 
should be if it is not the relentless pursuit of 
shareholder value. While Berger doesn’t and 
probably cannot provide a definitive answer to this 
difficult question, he does remark that long overdue 
is an expanded definition of corporate ownership ‘to 
include stakeholders central to the evolving 
understanding of corporate purpose’ (Berger, 2019; 
see in this regard Berger’s account of public benefit 
corporations and certified B Corps, both legal 
entities that provide public benefits not simply 
shareholder value). As Lynn Stout pointed out 
several years ago, the view that the sole or at least 
overriding purpose of the corporation is to 
maximise shareholder (or, stockholder) value is not 
fully supported by ‘law, history, logic, or the 
available empirical data’ (Stout, 2013). Amongst 
other things, the belief ‘in a single shareholder value’ 
is at odds with a number of realities. It does not fit 
with the diversity and inconsistency of shareholder 
interests. It also cannot account for the fact that the 
interests of stakeholders such as employees, 
suppliers and consumers are economically 
important (and, often quite different from those of 
shareholders) and therefore also worthy of 
consideration. The belief overlooks as well that 
maximising shareholder value doesn’t offer much 
help with the problem of keeping control over 
external costs or of ensuring that a company 
behaves in a socially responsible manner (Stout, 
2013; see also Hussain, Rigoni, & Orij, 2018 who 
empirically investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance and  triple bottom line 
sustainability performance through the lenses of 
agency theory and stakeholder theory). For Thomas 
Clarke, shareholder value is a ‘mythology’ and ‘one 
of the most debilitating ideologies of modern times’. 
Corporate managers are ‘incentivized and impelled’ 
to pursue shareholder value which is asserted by 
agency theory to be the ‘ultimate corporate 
objective’. According to Clarke, the relentless 
pursuit of shareholder value has ‘damaged and 
shrunk corporations, distracted and weakened 
managers, diverted and undermined economies, and, 
most paradoxically, neglected the long-term 
interests of shareholders’ (Clarke, 20153).  
The literature review has provided an 
introduction to current debates in the corporate 
governance literature about the meaning and 
purpose of corporate governance including how 
stakeholder interests can be served while 
shareholder value is pursued in a single-minded 
manner and, indeed, whether shareholder value 
should any longer be regarded as an end in itself. It 
has also considered changes in thinking about the 
purpose of the corporation when shareholder value 
is no longer taken to be its overriding purpose. The 
                                                          
3 Seen in these terms, the pursuit of shareholder value is closely related to 
the pursuit of economic growth which also has serious environmental, 
economic and social consequences. See , for example, Partington, 2019 who 
points out that many economists argue ‘that GDP is incapable of connecting 
the economy with social and environmental outcomes that determine our 
wellbeing and the sustainability of the planet’. 
Corporate Law & Governance Review/ Volume 1, Issue 2, 2019 
 
33 
literature review also provides a holistic 
introduction to the investigation that follows of the 
4th edition of the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations. The meaning and purpose of 
corporate governance, the way in which stakeholder 
interests should be served, and whether shareholder 
value should be regarded as an end in itself are all 
central issues in this investigation. The view adopted 
here is that only once these important matters have 
been settled can a meaningful debate begin about 
board governance and company performance and 
how governance and performance should be 
assessed.  
 
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRALIA: 
BOARD GOVERNANCE AND COMPANY 
PERFORMANCE  
3.1. A brief overview of Australia’s existing system 
of corporate governance: Legal and regulatory 
dimensions 
 
The Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) is the Australian corporate, 
markets and financial services regulator. More 
prosaically, ASIC is Australia’s chief corporate 
regulator. It is an ‘independent Commonwealth 
Australian Government body’ established by the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 2001 that defines its powers and which ASIC 
itself administers. However, most of ASIC’s 
regulatory activities are carried out under the 
Corporations Act 2001. ASIC has three strategic 
priorities: ‘Promoting investor and financial 
consumer trust and confidence’; ‘Ensuring fair, 
orderly and transparent markets’; ‘Providing 
efficient and accessible registration’ (ASIC, 2018a). 
Whether or not ASIC as corporate regulator lives up 
to these priorities and high ideals has been and 
remains a matter of considerable contention4. 
Corporations in Australia, and their boards and 
directors, are required to comply with some pretty 
light and basic rules and regulations with 
compliance being overseen by ASIC. For example, an 
Australian publicly-listed company must have a 
company secretary and at least three directors. 
Having fewer than three directors is a breach of the 
Corporations Act for which a non-compliant 
company can be fined or prosecuted. Directors and 
company secretaries must also ensure that the 
company keeps up-to-date and accurate financial 
and other records and to ensure that the company is 
solvent (by passing a resolution to this effect at a 
meeting of the board of directors). Company 
directors and company secretaries have as well 
several personal responsibilities imposed by the 
Corporations Act including ‘to be ‘honest and 
careful’, to know what the company is doing, to 
ensure that the company pays its debts in a timely 
fashion and keeps up-to-date and accurate financial 
records, to act in the best interests of the company 
rather than their own, and to use any information 
obtained as a result of being a director of the 
company in the company’s best interests’ (Rix and 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Verrender, 2018, Mottram, Clarke, and Attard, 2018, 
David, 2018, Danckert, 2018.  
Chandrakumara, 2017; see also ASIC, 2014, ASIC, 
2014a, ASIC, 2014b). Directors also have a duty to 
disclose at a board meeting any conflicts of interests 
or personal interests that could potentially impede 
their ability to act in the best interests of their 
company. A person who is an undischarged 
bankrupt or who has a criminal conviction or been 
convicted of a company law offence is not permitted 
to be a company director.  
The Corporate Governance Council of the ASX 
represents prominent business, shareholder and 
industry groups and plays an important role in 
setting corporate governance standards for 
companies listed on the ASX5. The main purpose of 
the Council is ‘to develop and issue principle-based 
recommendations on the corporate governance 
practices to be adopted by ASX listed entities’ with a 
view to enhancing investor confidence and assisting 
listed entities ‘to meet stakeholder expectations in 
relation to their governance’ (ASX, n.d.). The 
Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations sets out an authoritative list of 
‘recommended corporate governance practices for 
entities listed on the ASX that, in the Council’s view, 
are likely to achieve good governance outcomes and 
meet the reasonable expectations of most investors 
in most situations’ (ASX, 2014). The Principles and 
Recommendations are not surprisingly based on and 
reflect the ASX Listing Rules but most specifically 
Rule 4.10.3 which requires a listed entity to include 
either in its annual report or on its website a 
‘governance statement’ disclosing ‘the extent to 
which the entity has followed the recommendations 
set by the Council during the reporting period’ (ASX, 
2018). In other words, Rule 4.10.3 obliges listed 
entities ‘to benchmark their corporate governance 
practices against the Council’s recommendations 
and, where they do not conform, to disclose that fact 
and the reasons why’ (ASX, n.d.). Should an entity 
not have followed any of the recommendations it 
must in its governance statement identify which 
recommendation or recommendations haven’t been 
followed, provide reasons justifying why it hasn’t 
followed the recommendation/s, and explain 
whether any alternative governance arrangements 
have been adopted. This is known as the ‘if not, why 
not’ approach, framework or requirement (ASX 2014; 
ASX, 2018a). 
 
3.2. The changing Australian corporate governance 
system: A brief introduction and overview 
 
As seen above, in issuing a Consultation Draft of the 
new edition of the Principles and Recommendations 
the ASX Corporate Governance Council began a 
process of public consultation with the business, 
shareholder and industry groups that comprise the 
Council’s membership. The purpose of the 
Consultation Draft (and, the Consultation Paper) was 
to seek the views on the proposed changes to the 
Principles and Recommendations of the broad range 
of stakeholders represented by these groups. The 
new edition is the fourth and revises and updates 
the 3rd edition which was published in 2014 (for 
brief discussion of the 3rd edition, see Rix and 
Chandrakumara, 2017). The final version of the 4th 
edition was released in February 2019. The Council 
                                                          
5 For the full list of Council members, see ASX, 2018a. 
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noted in its May 2018 Consultation Paper as it did in 
the Draft and the final version that the Principles 
and Recommendations apply to all listed entities 
irrespective of their legal form, and whether or not 
they are established in Australia or in another 
jurisdiction and are internally or externally managed 
(ASX, 2018a; ASX, 2019). 
As the Consultation Paper put it, the then 
proposed new, 2019 edition of the Principles and 
Recommendations sought to address ‘emerging and 
global issues’ having an impact on corporate 
governance and how it is or should be practised. The 
Corporate Governance Council clearly believed that 
these issues either were not adequately addressed in 
the 2014 edition or not considered in it at all. In any 
event, among the emerging and global governance 
issues that would be addressed in the 2019 version 
were the social licence to operate, corporate culture 
and values, whistleblowing and whistleblower 
protection policies, policies targeting corruption and 
bribery6, board-level gender diversity, and policies 
addressing cyber risks and risks arising from 
climate change (ASX, 2018a). The Council also made 
clear in the Consultation Paper its strong belief that 
the changes and revisions it was considering for 
inclusion could be accommodated within the 
existing ‘if not, why not’ framework.  
It should also be noted here that the changes to 
the Principles and Recommendations the Corporate 
Governance Council proposed in the Consultation 
Paper both anticipated and responded to the 
findings of recent public enquires but, in particular, 
the significant corporate governance (and, 
regulatory) failings that were disclosed and exposed 
in the Hayne Royal Commission. This Commission, 
formally the Royal Commission into Misconduct in 
the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry presided over by Commissioner the 
Honourable Kenneth Madison Hayne (formerly a 
Justice of the High Court of Australia), was belatedly 
and very reluctantly established by the Australian 
Government in mid-December 2017. The 
Commission issued an interim report (in three 
volumes and with a separate Executive Summary) at 
the end of September 2018 and released a final 
report at the beginning of February 20197. In 
establishing the Royal Commission, the Australian 
Government handed the Commission a remit to 
‘consider the conduct of banks, insurers, financial 
services providers and superannuation funds (not 
including self-managed superannuation funds)’ and 
investigate ‘how well equipped regulators in 
particular, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) are to identify and 
address misconduct’ (Morrison and Turnbull, 2018). 
The Royal Commission’s remit, or Terms of 
Reference, did not extend to a consideration of 
macro-financial stability or the resilience of 
                                                          
6 For some idea of the extent of the problem of bribery and corruption 
around the world, also demonstrating that it is a very significant corporate 
governance issue, see Dell and McDevitt, 2018.  
7 The three volumes of the Interim Report and the Executive Summary can 
be found at https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov.au/Pages/reports. 
aspx. The Final Report, released on 1 February 2019 and tabled in 
Parliament on 4 February and also in three volumes, can also be found at 
this link. Chapter 6 of the Final Report deals with questions and makes 
recommendations relating to Culture, governance and remuneration in 
entities across the Australian financial services industry.  
Australia’s banks, clearly one of its shortcomings 
and a significant one at that. 
It is not an overstatement to say that the 
revelations in the Royal Commission of breathtaking 
misconduct, illegal and unethical behaviour 
including utter contempt for, and cheating or 
deception of, customers have led to a crisis of public 
confidence in Australian banks, in particular, the 
‘Big Four’ (Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 
National Australia Bank, Westpac, and ANZ) and in 
other major players in the country’s superannuation 
and insurance industries. Whether or not this crisis 
of confidence extends to investors and shareholders 
is perhaps a question that can only answered over 
the longer term and allowing for the usual and 
expected fluctuations in banks’ and financial 
institutions’ share prices. In any event, the conduct 
and behaviour exposed by the Royal Commission 
have also made a mockery of banks’ and financial 
institutions’ codes of conduct and associated ethics 
and corporate social responsibility ‘commitments’. 
The disclosures in the Royal Commission have as 
well revealed that Australia’s banks have adopted at 
best a cavalier, tick-a-box approach to corporate 
governance and the well-established, core principles 
underpinning it, pre-eminently, transparency and 
disclosure, responsibility and accountability, and 
integrity and honesty8. 
 
4. THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS: BOARD 
GOVERNANCE AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE IN A 
CHANGING DISPENSATION 
 
4.1. Corporate culture 
 
The principal proposed revisions to the Principles 
and Recommendations, contained in the 
Consultation Draft, amounted essentially to a 
significant redrafting of Principle 3 that had in 
earlier versions simply enunciated a basic 
expectation that boards and management of listed 
entities should behave ethically and responsibly. The 
revision of the text of this Principle in the Draft 
included a major rewording and extension so that it 
became ‘Instil the desired culture: A listed entity 
should instil and continually reinforce a culture 
across the organisation of acting lawfully, ethically 
and in a socially responsible manner (ASX, 2018b).’ 
As seen above, the Consultation Paper made clear 
the Corporate Governance Council’s belief that by 
acting in a lawful, ethical and responsible manner a 
company’s board and management can 
unambiguously demonstrate their understanding of 
the ‘fundamental importance’ of the company’s 
social licence to operate and commitment to 
sustaining this over the longer term (ASX, 2018a). 
Taking this a large step further, the Consultation 
Draft referred to a social licence to operate as one of 
a listed entity’s ‘most valuable assets’ (ASX, 2018b). 
As has already been noted above, the final 
version of the 4th edition makes no explicit reference 
to the social licence to operate and with its removal 
                                                          
8 For some of the media, academic and other coverage of the Banking Royal 
Commission’s hearings and disclosures see, for example, Linden and Staples, 
2018a, Linden and Staples, 2018b, Braddon and Hooper, 2018, Gergis, 
2018, Petschler, 2018, Knight, 2018, Beck and Paton, 2018.  
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seemingly abandons one of the consultation Draft’s 
principal and most valuable assets9. In spite of 
jettisoning the social licence, however, the final 
version does slightly expand on the text of 
Principle 3. This now reads ‘Instil a culture of acting 
lawfully, ethically and responsibly: a listed entity 
should instil and continually reinforce a culture 
across the organisation of acting lawfully, ethically 
and responsibly’ (ASX, 2019). The Draft’s 
Commentary on Principle 3 contained a quite 
lengthy explanation about why the social licence 
deserves to be regarded as one of a listed entity’s 
most valuable assets. This Commentary provided as 
well an account of how an entity can go about 
building and sustaining its social licence by earning 
and maintaining the trust of a broader range of 
stakeholders than just its shareholders. The Draft’s 
Commentary also made the point that an entity’s 
ability to support and generate ‘long term and 
sustainable value creation’ is based on the trust 
earned from the different stakeholders (ASX, 2018b; 
the full Commentary to draft Principle 3 can also be 
found here).  
Recommendation 3.1 in the Draft version reads 
‘A listed entity should articulate and disclose its 
core values’ (the final version of this 
Recommendation refers only to ‘values’). The 
Commentary to this Recommendation in the Draft 
emphasises that because of the importance of an 
entity’s social licence to operate, ‘it the statement of 
core values will usually contain a commitment by the 
entity to complying fully with its legal obligations 
and to acting ethically and in a socially responsible 
manner’ ASX, 2018b; emphasis added). Not only can 
a statement of core values ‘properly implemented’ 
be the basis on which an entity builds its corporate 
culture but also encourage ‘good decision making’ 
and function as a useful recruitment and retention 
tool. To serve these purposes, however, an entity’s 
statement of its core values has to be a good deal 
more than ‘a poster on a wall’. On the contrary, the 
core values must be lived and breathed by the entity, 
and its board, senior management and employees. 
This highlights the need for ethical leadership from 
board and senior management who should lead by 
example firmly to ‘set the tone at the top’. As the 
Consultation Draft states, ‘this includes ensuring 
that their own actions and decisions are consistent 
with the entity’s stated values and that any conduct 
by others within the organisation that is inconsistent 
with those values is dealt with appropriately and 
proportionately’ (ASX, 2018b). 
The Commentary to Recommendation 3 in the 
final version as already noted contains no mention 
of the social licence and is therefore a good deal 
briefer than the draft version. However, the final 
version suggests that in ‘formulating its values’ a 
listed entity should ‘consider what behaviours are 
needed from its officers and employees to build long 
term sustainable value for its security holders 
including the need for the entity to preserve and 
protect its reputation and standing in the 
community and with key stakeholders, such as 
customers, employees, suppliers, creditors, law 
makers and regulators’ (ASX, 2019; these key 
stakeholders are the same as those included in the 
                                                          
9 For some of the corporate governance and other issues raised by the social 
licence to operate see, for example, Cullen-Knox et al, 2017, Wright and 
Bice, 2017, Black, 2018.  
Draft’s commentary on the social licence). While it is 
ultimately the board that has responsibility for 
formulating and approving an entity’s statement of 
values, the final version puts more onus than the 
Draft did on the entity’s ‘executive team’ to 
‘inculcate’ the company’s stated values throughout 
the entire organisation. Inculcating these values 
across the organisation requires the executive team 
to ensure that all of the entity’s employees acquire 
‘appropriate training’ on its values. In interacting 
with staff, senior executive should as well 
continually reference and reinforce the values in this 
way setting the ‘tone at the top’ (ASX, 2019).  
Consistent with the desire to win the genuine 
and lasting trust of key stakeholders, and of the 
public more generally, Principle 3 in both the Draft 
and the final version also includes new 
Recommendations 3.3 and 3.4 dealing respectively 
with the need for a listed entity to have and disclose 
a whistleblowing policy and an anti-bribery and 
corruption policy. In both versions, 
Recommendations 3.3 and 3.4 are divided into parts 
a) and b). The Commentary in the final version on 
these two Recommendations is considerably briefer 
and less detailed than that in the Draft. In the 
following, the two Recommendations will be 
considered in turn with the focus being on part a) of 
each.  
Before doing so, however, it needs to be 
pointed out that in the Draft, Recommendation 3.3b 
stated that an entity should ‘ensure that the board is 
informed of any material concerns raised under that 
policy that call into question the culture of the 
organisation’ (ASX, 2018b; emphasis added). In the 
final version, part b) simply states that the entity 
should ‘ensure that the board or a committee of the 
board is informed of any material incidents reported 
under the policy’ (ASX, 2019) thus converting mere 
‘concerns’ into the harder ‘incidents’, jettisoning any 
mention of culture as well as adding reference to ‘a 
committee of the board’. In both versions, 
Recommendation 3.4a calls for an entity to have and 
disclose an anti-bribery and corruption policy with 
the final version stating in 3.4b as it did in 3.3b that 
the board or a committee of the board should be 
informed of any material breaches of this policy 
(there was no reference in Draft 3.4b to a board 
committee). 
 
4.2. Whistleblowing policy 
 
Recommendation 3.3 states (in both versions) that 
the purpose of a whistleblower policy is to 
encourage employees, who in the words of the Draft 
are ‘the best source of information about whether a 
listed entity is living up to it values’, to report 
suspected unethical, unlawful or socially 
irresponsible conduct (‘socially’ is not in the final 
version). The Draft also calls for listed entities to 
‘instil and continually reinforce a culture of 
‘speaking up’. Employees should in addition have 
confidence that there are ‘suitable protections’ of 
their identity and confidentiality to safeguard them 
from ‘retaliation or victimisation’ when they 'speak 
up’ (ASX, 2018b). Much of the remainder of the 
Commentary in the Draft on Recommendation 3.3 
deals with the sorts of suspicious behaviour or 
observed incidents that employees should report 
under the whistleblowing policy and how these 
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should be reported and to whom. It therefore 
amongst other things also calls for adequate training 
both for employees about the policy including their 
rights and obligations under the policy and for 
managers who are authorised to receive 
‘whistleblowing reports’ about the appropriate way 
of dealing with any disclosures they receive. 
As noted above, the Commentary on this 
Recommendation in the final version is much briefer 
than that in the Draft. As in the Draft, the final 
version acknowledges that employees are usually the 
best source of information on whether or not an 
entity is living up to its values and that its 
whistleblower policy should therefore encourage 
them ‘to speak up about any unlawful, unethical or 
irresponsible behaviour within the organisation’ 
(ASX, 2019). Beyond this, the Commentary in the 
final version simply reiterates the Recommendation 
in slightly longer form and makes no mention of 
encouraging a culture of speaking up, of the need 
for adequate whistleblower protections, or of the 
requirement for appropriate training.  
 
4.3. Anti-bribery and corruption policy 
 
As already seen, in both versions Recommendation 
3.4 calls on listed entities to have an anti-bribery 
and corruption policy and to ensure that their board 
(committee of the board is added in the final 
version) is advised of any ‘material breaches’ of the 
policy. As both the Draft and final version point out, 
it is a serious criminal offence to give bribes or other 
‘improper payments’ to public officials because 
doing so ‘can do major damage to a listed entity’s 
social licence to operate’ (ASX, 2018b) or ‘damage a 
listed entity’s reputation and standing in the 
community’ (ASX, 2019). Amongst other things, and 
just as was the case with Recommendation 3.3, the 
Draft’s Commentary on this recommendation 
includes a call for adequate training of managers 
and employees who could be exposed to bribery or 
corruption on how these can be detected and 
appropriate ways of dealing with occurrences of 
them (ASX, 2018b). There is no mention of the need 
for training in the final version.  
 
5. THE NEW PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS: SOME MAJOR RESPONSES 
AND REACTIONS  
5.1. Australian Institute of Company Directors 
(AICD) 
 
Before considering AICD’s response to the 
Consultation Draft, a brief introduction to its role 
and mission will be in order. The Mission of the 
Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) is, 
according to its website, ‘to provide leadership on 
director issues and promote excellence in 
governance to achieve a positive impact for the 
economy and society’ by undertaking ‘governance 
education, director development and advocacy’ 
(AICD, 2018a). The Institute is a national 
organisation comprising seven state and territory 
divisions and with a national Board (its ‘governing 
body’) consisting of 12 directors; it has a 
membership of 40,000 including directors and other 
‘senior leaders from business, government and the 
not-for-profit sectors’ (AICD, 2018a). As its 
Constitution points out, the Institute is a public 
company limited by guarantee having as its key 
objectives ‘through education, to promote 
excellence, enterprise and integrity in the directors 
of all corporations, to improve their knowledge and 
skill with respect to their rights, duties and 
responsibilities and to inculcate the highest 
standards of ethics among directors’ (AICD, 2016).  
With such mission, membership and objectives 
as these it could too easily be assumed that AICD 
would simply fall in to line with the draft 4th edition 
of the ASX’s Corporate Governance Council 
Principles and Recommendations and welcome the 
Consultation Draft with open arms an endorsement 
which would likely have seen it become the final 
version with little or no further revision. AICD did 
seem broadly to welcome the Draft, or at least the 
opportunity to respond to it in detail, agreeing with 
the Corporate Governance Council that ‘now is an 
opportune time to review the Principles and 
consider whether they remain fit-for-purpose in the 
context of emerging domestic and global issues in 
corporate governance’ (AICD, 2018b: 1). AICD also 
acknowledged in its submission that the proposed 
amendments contained in the Draft ‘cover many 
topical and important issues’. It supported as well 
the ‘focus on long-term value creation’ and the 
Draft’s recognition of the importance of ‘active 
consideration and engagement by listed entities with 
stakeholders and community expectations’ (AICD, 
2018b: 2). However, in its response AICD did as well 
express a number of what can only regarded as 
serious concerns and misgivings that it had about 
the direction the Principles and Recommendations 
appeared to be taking.  
Seeming to ignore the Corporate Governance 
Council’s assurances to the contrary, AICD was 
principally concerned with the apparent move in the 
Draft from a ‘principles-based approach’ to one that 
it regarded was ‘becoming too granular or 
prescriptive’ (AICD, 2018b). In spite of the retention 
in the Draft of the ‘if not, why not’ approach, AICD 
thought the adoption of what it regarded as a more 
prescriptive approach carried with it a considerable 
risk of listed entities adhering to the Principles ‘as a 
‘check box’ compliance matter rather than as a 
starting-point for a consideration of their own 
corporate governance needs’ (AICD, 2018b). In 
addition, in AICD’s view more prescriptive and 
accordingly more demanding expectations like the 
ones the Council was recommending could deter 
‘smaller, resource-constrained’ companies (which 
make up the majority of ASX-listed entities) from 
fully embracing and supporting the spirit and the 
letter of the redrafted Principles. It took particular 
exception to ‘the increased level of commentary and 
prescription (from a 38 page third edition to a 
proposed 55 page fourth edition) which risks 
detracting focus from the most material issues’ as 
well as ‘deviating from established legal frameworks’ 
(AICD, 2018b; the final version is 36 pages in 
length)10. 
AICD was especially agitated by the inclusion in 
the Draft of the ‘concepts’ of ‘social licence to 
operate’ and ‘acting in a socially responsible 
manner’. In its view these concepts are ‘subjective’ 
                                                          
10 See also AICD, 2017  
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(the former, even ‘highly subjective’) and ‘fluid’ ones. 
And, for AICD, the concepts not only amount to an 
addition of unneeded ‘complexity and uncertainty’ 
to the already-complex and demanding governance 
mix but also do not properly reflect the existing 
‘legal and fiduciary duties of directors’, in particular, 
the statutory duties of directors as laid down in the 
Corporations Act 2001 (AICD, 2018b). Not only did 
AICD regard the two concepts as being subjective 
but, specifically with respect to social licence 
thought that it carried as well a risk of being 
‘interpreted differently by different stakeholders’ 
whose interests in any case are ‘often complex and 
competing’ (AICD, 2018b). 
As for Recommendations 3.3 and 3.4 for 
entities to have respectively a whistleblowing policy 
and an anti-corruption and bribery policy, AICD’s 
response was what only can be described as 
somewhat dismissive if not downright pejorative. In 
AICD’s view, the recommendation to have a 
whistleblowing policy was essentially redundant (not 
its term) because the Australian Government was 
considering the introduction of legislation  that will 
likely impose ‘different obligations upon companies’ 
from those being proposed by ASX11. And, AICD 
thought that the anti-corruption and bribery policy 
Recommendation ran the risk ‘that by focusing on 
anti-bribery and corruption policies, other equally 
important issues could be seen as requiring less 
focus’ (AICD, 2018b). AICD provided examples of 
neither the different obligations nor the other 
equally important issues to which it was referring. 
AICD announced and commented on the 
release of the final version of 4th edition of the 
Principles and Recommendations in two publications 
in its on-line journals Membership Update and 
Company Director. In the first of these, Sally 
Linwood (Senior Policy Adviser) and Christian Gergis 
(Head of Policy) highlighted amongst other things 
the inclusion in the final version of the requirements 
for listed entities: to articulate and disclose their 
values; to have a ‘robust’ whistleblowing policy (as it 
noted, this is now particularly important in light of 
the passing by the Australian Parliament of the 
enhancing whistleblower protections Act); and, to 
disclose to the board or a board committee material 
incidents reported under the whistleblowing policy 
or material breaches of the anti-bribery and 
corruption policy (Linwood & Gergis, 2019a). 
Linwood and Gergis coyly pointed out that the social 
licence to operate ‘did not find its way’ into the final 
version. They also remarked that the social licence 
‘had been the subject of heated debate’ during the 
consultation process revealing ‘a wide gulf of 
opinion between those who saw the concept as 
pivotal to business operating in a broader societal 
context, and others, like the AICD, who believed that 
such a subjective term had no place in a quasi-
regulatory document’ (Linwood & Gergis, 2019a). 
The second AICD publication on the final version, 
also authored by Linwood and Gergis, essentially 
provides a re-run of the first publication (Linwood & 
Gergis, 2019b). 
                                                          
11 In the period between the appearance of the Draft and the release of the 
final version of the 4th edition of the Principles and Recommendations, the 
Australian Parliament passed the Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing 
Whistleblower Protections) Act 2019 receiving Royal Ascent on 12 March 
2019. The Act can be found at the following link: 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2019A00010.   
5.2. Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) 
 
In ASIC’s submission to the Corporate Governance 
Council providing its commentary on and 
recommended amendments to the Consultation 
Draft, it expressed the view that the primary 
purpose of corporate governance principles and 
standards should be to provide investors with ‘clear 
disclosure’ of a listed entity’s ‘actual corporate 
governance practices’ and, where necessary, bring 
about enhancements of these practices (ASIC, 
2018b). One of its chief concerns was accordingly 
that corporate governance statements in Australia, 
like those required under ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 
(which, as explained above, outlines the ‘if not, why 
not’ approach or framework), ‘sometimes lack 
transparency’ because they don’t always provide an 
accurate picture of the corporate practices actually 
followed by an entity. This can mean that entities 
are required simply ‘to disclose the existence of a 
governance policy or framework rather than how’ 
the policy or framework is implemented leading to 
‘inadequate and largely meaningless disclosure’ of a 
‘boilerplate’ sort which is merely rolled over without 
change or revision from one year to the next (ASIC, 
2018b). In sum, boilerplate and ‘tick the box’ 
disclosure requirements like these ‘detract from the 
objectives of driving improvements in practices or 
even of setting an effective baseline standard of 
governance for larger listed entities’ (ASIC, 2018b).  
ASIC therefore recommended that the 
Corporate Governance Council consider an 
alternative model of disclosing against the Principles 
and Recommendations which it believed should 
ideally provide a ‘best practice’ model of corporate 
governance for listed entities. This would require a 
listed entity to produce:  
 ‘a standalone document describing its 
corporate governance framework’ that would be 
made available to investors on the entity’s website 
with a link to this document provided in the entity’s 
Corporate Governance statement;  
 ‘an annual statement describing the entity’s 
implementation of the corporate governance 
framework’ (ASIC, 2018b).  
In addition, ASIC recommended that the ASX 
actively monitor and assess the disclosures made by 
entities under the Principles and Recommendations. 
It also thought that the Principles and 
Recommendations should have the function of 
setting ‘a minimum level of governance practices’ for 
larger listed entities which is an expectation 
‘consistent with the degree of attention given to 
recent governance failures by these entities 
highlighted by the Banking Royal Commission and 
APRA’s inquiry into CBA and the need for larger 
listed entities to be held to a higher standard of 
conduct (ASIC, 2018b)12. In view of these 
considerations, ASIC suggested that the ASX could 
even consider making all or some of its Listing Rules 
mandatory for the larger entities on its official list 
or promoting some recommendations to the status 
of Listing Rules. As observed above (n. 1), ASIC 
offered no formal or public response to the release 
of the final version of the 4th edition. 
                                                          
12 For the background to and outcomes of APRA’s CBA inquiry, see Ryan, 
2018 and APRA, 2018.   
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5.3. Australian Council of Superannuation Investors 
(ACSI) 
 
ACSI has a membership of 39 Australian and 
international institutional investors and asset 
owners which in aggregate ‘manage over $2.2 trillion 
in assets and own on average 10% of every ASX200 
company’ (ACSI, 2016). ACSI was established in 2001 
to serve as a ‘strong and collective’ voice for its 
members ‘on environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) issues’ based on their shared belief ‘that ESG 
risks and opportunities have a material impact on 
investment outcomes.’ ACSI’s members also believe 
that as fiduciary investors ‘they have a responsibility 
to act to enhance the long-term value of the savings 
entrusted to them’ and therefore ‘collaborate 
through ACSI to achieve genuine, measurable and 
permanent improvements in the ESG practices and 
performance of the companies they invest in’ (ACSI, 
2016).  
In its submission to the Corporate Governance 
Council’s stakeholder consultation on the draft 4th 
edition of the Principles and Recommendations, ACSI 
welcomed the new edition because it ‘reflects 
evolving perspectives in best practice corporate 
governance and include a greater emphasis on 
values, ethics and broader stakeholder 
accountability’. It accordingly gave strong support to 
the amendments and additions proposed by the 
Council that will ‘strengthen the Principles and 
Recommendations and successfully address a range 
of contemporary governance concerns’ and ‘provide 
investors and other stakeholders with improved 
insight into the robustness and effectiveness of the 
entities that they invest in’ (ACSI, 2018). The 
contemporary governance concerns that ACSI was 
glad to see addressed in the new edition include the 
social licence to operate, corporate values and 
culture, ‘whistleblower rules’, anti-bribery and 
corruption policies, improving diversity, corporate 
reporting, and climate-related disclosures13.  
ACSI strongly supported ‘the expansion of 
Principle 3 to include instilling and continually 
reinforcing a culture across the organisation of 
acting lawfully, ethically and in a socially 
responsible manner’ because ‘a listed entity’s social 
licence to operate is one of its most valuable assets’ 
which can be ‘lost or seriously damaged’ when the 
entity, its directors or employees ‘are perceived to 
have acted unlawfully, unethically or in a socially 
irresponsible manner (ACSI, 2018). Without referring 
to any cases in particular, ACSI pointed out that 
‘recent examples demonstrate that corporate 
misconduct can have dire consequences for 
shareholder value’. On the other hand, ‘a strong 
corporate culture can contribute to the attraction 
and retention of talent, the development and 
maintenance of reputation and trust and support 
the effectiveness and efficiency of operational 
management’ as well as contributing to ‘financial 
strength and resilience’ (ACSI, 2018). In ACSI’s view, 
‘improved transparency’ is another important way of 
rebuilding the trust of investors and ‘a broader 
                                                          
13 See also ACSI, 2017, ACSI Governance Guidelines: A guide to investor 
expectations of Australian listed companies. The core principles 
underpinning ACSI’s Governance Guidelines are: Board oversight of all 
material risks; Sustainable, long-term value creation; Active ownership; 
Transparency; Licence to operate. A brief explanation of each principle is 
provided at page 5 of the Guidelines.   
group of stakeholders’ and therefore also of 
assuring that shareholder value can continue to be 
increased on a sustainable basis.  
In a Media Release on 27 February 2019 and in 
keeping with its counterparts, ACSI welcomed the 
release of the final version of the 4th edition. It noted 
that a catalyst for the review of the Principles ‘was 
the desire to address emerging concerns around 
corporate culture and trust’ and also observed that 
‘the importance of corporate culture, trust and the 
link to a company’s reputation and standing in the 
community has again been highlighted by the Royal 
Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry’ 
(ACSI, 2019). While the Media Release made no 
mention of the omission of the social licence to 
operate in the final version – the presence of which 
in the Draft ACSI had so fulsomely praised – it 
nevertheless strongly supported ‘the new provisions 
introduced on corporate values and appropriate 
treatment of stakeholders, corporate culture, 
diversity, remuneration and risk’ (ACSI, 2019). The 
media release highlighted amongst other things the 
Recommendations requiring listed entities to 
articulate and disclose their values and support a 
healthy culture through having and disclosing a 
whistle-blower policy and an anti-bribery and 
corruption policy. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS: BOARD GOVERNANCE AND 
COMPANY PERFORMANCE IN THE NEW SYSTEM 
 
The Draft of the 4th edition of the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council’s Principles and 
Recommendations made a valuable (and, frankly 
quite daring) but sadly short-lived contribution to 
the hotly debated question, within Australia and 
globally, about the criteria by which board and 
company performance should be measured. This is a 
question that goes to nothing less than the very 
point or purpose of corporate governance. In the 
end, then, it is a question about exactly what 
corporate governance is and why it matters, more 
correctly, whether it does matter at all.  
The Draft made fairly clear the Corporate 
Governance Council’s belief that corporate 
governance does matter but really only when the 
interests of stakeholders, other than shareholders 
and investors, are genuinely taken in to account in 
the decision making of company boards and 
directors and resulting actions of executive 
managers and other employees. These actions and 
decisions after all are the basis of stakeholders’ 
trust and determine whether a company earns a 
social licence to operate from them. However, it left 
largely unaddressed the issue of how company 
directors, and by extension senior managers as well, 
should be remunerated because profit, share price 
and dividend can no longer be taken as the sole or 
even most important measures of a company’s 
performance at least in the short term. More 
challengingly in governance terms, it promoted non-
shareholder stakeholders to an almost equal footing 
with their shareholder counterparts and inversely 
relegated shareholders to mere stakeholders. It 
therefore remained to be seen whether the 
Consultation Draft survived in its published form 
and if it did whether the Principles and 
Recommendations continued to have the authority 
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that it once had and remained the benchmark it was 
always intended to be. Promisingly, the fulsome 
welcome with which ACSI had greeted the new 
edition suggested that it just might. If so, it would 
have helped to set the future course for corporate 
governance as a set of principles, a field of practice 
and as an academic discipline.  
It appears that the Principles and 
Recommendations in its 4th edition does retain the 
authority it has long held and remains the 
benchmark governance document for corporate 
(and, non-corporate) Australia. However, the 
omission from the final version of the social licence 
to operate and of the related commentary which 
highlighted the importance of core values and 
behaving ethically and in a socially responsible 
manner suggests that corporate Australia still has a 
long way to go before long-term and sustainable 
value creation displaces a self-defeating focus on 
short-termism. Clearly, organisations like the AICD 
exerted considerable pressure on the Corporate 
Governance Council to remove or lessen the strong 
emphasis on these principles and issues that was 
one of the Draft’s most valuable assets. ACSI 
obviously had far less influence. It seems then that 
corporate Australia has yet to fully acknowledge the 
risk that climate change presents to value creation 
even in the short term and therefore of the need to 
change governance principles, structures and 
practices to meet this challenge before it is too late. 
The Corporate Governance Council had valiantly 
attempted to set corporate Australia on a course of 
long-term sustainability and resilience but 
unfortunately it fell at the final hurdle.  
 
7. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The article has several limitations. It has provided an 
in-depth analysis of important sections of the 
Principles and Recommendations in its Draft and 
final versions and some commentary on the 
responses to both versions of several of the 
Corporate Governance Council’s principal 
stakeholders. There are clearly abundant 
opportunities for researchers in the future to look at 
the Principles and Recommendations more 
holistically and to monitor how much impact over 
the coming 5 to 10 years or so the document has on 
the conduct in Australia of corporate governance, on 
company behaviour more generally, and on the 
reactions of retail and institutional shareholders. 
There will also be many opportunities for research 
comparing contemporary developments in 
Australian corporate governance with developments 
elsewhere around the world. 
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